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Abstract		This	 thesis	 investigates	 whether	 South-South	 Cooperation	 can	 lead	 to	agricultural	 growth	 in	 Africa,	 based	 on	 the	 transfer	 of	 knowledge	 and	 best-practice	 techniques	 developed	 in	 Brazil.	 Using	 a	 case	 study	 analysis	 of	ProSAVANA,	 a	 triangular	 cooperation	 project	 between	 Japan,	 Brazil	 and	Mozambique,	 this	 thesis	 analyses	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 the	 project	 in	 combining	financial	aid	with	technical	knowledge	transfer	to	cultivate	the	Nacala	Corridor	of	 Northern	 Mozambique.	 Based	 on	 the	 findings	 of	 the	 case	 study,	 this	 thesis	argues	 ProSAVANA	 has	 been	 largely	 unsuccessful	 in	 achieving	 agricultural	development	 in	 Mozambique.	 This	 is	 primarily	 due	 to	 its	 focus	 on	 private	investment	 and	 commercial	 gains,	 which	 has	 been	 heavily	 criticised	 by	 civil	society	 groups	 and	 local	 farmers	 in	 Mozambique.	 This	 paper	 concludes	 by	arguing	that	ProSAVANA	is	damaging	the	long-term	reputation	of	SSC,	following	claims	of	land	grabbing	and	exploitation	of	resources,	which	is	in	stark	contrast	to	 its	 principles	 of	 shared	 development	 goals	 and	mutual	 respect.	 This	 harms	SSC’s	chances	of	changing	the	development	landscape	in	the	long	run.				
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Introduction		In	1973,	Embrapa	was	 created	as	 an	agricultural	 research	 institution	 in	Brazil,	tasked	with	achieving	growth	 in	 the	agricultural	 sector	 in	order	 to	overcome	a	major	 food	 shortage	 crisis.	Today	Embrapa	 is	hailed	as	a	 great	 success,	having	overcome	Brazil’s	 food	 scarcity	 issue	 and	 becoming	 one	 of	 the	world’s	 largest	food	exporters.	Brazil	now	uses	its	success	in	tackling	a	wide	range	of	issues	in	its	own	country,	to	promote	international	development	and	advocate	for	South-South	 Cooperation	 (SSC).	 Having	 significantly	 increased	 its	 presence	 in	 Africa,	Brazil	has	led	many	development	projects	in	areas	such	as	health,	education	and	agriculture.	Combining	financial	assistance	with	a	transfer	of	technical	expertise,	it	 hopes	 to	 help	 its	 developing	 partners	 achieve	 the	 same	 successes	 and	overcome	similar	problems.		This	thesis	will	focus	on	agriculture	specifically	and	analyse	 how	 effective	 SSC	 has	 been	 in	 developing	 the	 Nacala	 Corridor	 of	Mozambique,	based	on	similar	practices	previously	developed	in	Brazil.				Beginning	 with	 a	 discussion	 on	 why	 states	 offer	 international	 development	assistance,	 based	 on	 various	 theories	 of	 international	 cooperation,	 this	 thesis	shall	 look	at	 the	difference	of	SSC	 in	comparison	to	 traditional	North-South	aid	assistance.	This	traditional	form	of	aid	is	often	tied	with	conditionalities	such	as	the	 implementation	 of	 good	 governance	 and	 neoliberal	 economic	 policies,	irrespective	of	whether	these	suit	the	needs	of	the	recipient	country.	SSC	focuses	on	 shared	 development	 goals	 and	 is	 designed	 to	 better	 suit	 the	 needs	 of	 the	countries	receiving	assistance.	In	order	to	expand	on	this,	the	paper	shall	provide	context	 to	 the	 ProSAVANA	 project,	 by	 looking	 at	 previous	 instances	 of	 SSC	between	 Brazil	 and	 African	 nations	 and	 the	 development	 of	 Brazil’s	 own	agricultural	sector	as	a	result	of	cooperation	with	Japan.				Using	 a	 case	 study	 analysis	 of	 ProSAVANA,	 a	 triangular	 cooperation	 project	between	 Brazil,	 Japan	 and	Mozambique,	 this	 thesis	 shall	 discuss	 how	 effective	this	particular	project	has	been	in	achieving	agricultural	growth	in	Mozambique.	This	 project	 was	 modelled	 on	 PROCEDER,	 which	 saw	 the	 cultivation	 of	 the	Brazilian	 Cerrado,	 with	 the	 help	 of	 Japan,	 to	 adapt	 the	 soybean	 to	 what	 was	
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previously	 unfertile	 land.	 The	 primary	 objective	 behind	 ProSAVANA	 is	 to	combine	financial	resources	 from	Japan	with	technical	expertise	 from	Brazil,	 in	order	 to	 positively	 transform	 the	 Nacala	 Corridor	 in	 Northern	 Mozambique,	leading	to	increased	agricultural	growth	in	the	region.	However,	this	project	has	received	 a	 great	 deal	 of	 criticism,	 with	 many	 local	 farmers	 in	 Mozambique	branding	it	as	an	attempted	‘land-grab’	due	to	the	major	role	of	private	investors	and	commercialisation	of	farming	practices.	This	criticism	draws	attention	to	the	well-debated	motives	behind	inter-state	cooperation	and	who	really	benefits.	In	order	to	address	this,	the	thesis	shall	briefly	look	at	why	Brazil	cooperates	with	other	 states	 and	 more	 importantly,	 the	 impact	 that	 these	 criticisms	 of	 Brazil	exploiting	African	resources	have	on	the	long-term	legitimacy	of	SSC.		By	 analysing	 the	 case	 of	 ProSAVANA,	 this	 thesis	 will	 investigate	 whether	 this	new	 form	 of	 development	 assistance	 offered	 by	 Brazil	 through	 SSC	 is	 really	changing	 the	 development	 landscape	 and	 providing	 assistance	 to	 developing	countries	 based	 on	 their	 specific	 needs,	with	 respect	 for	 their	 sovereignty	 and	shared	 goals	 of	 development.	 Or,	 whether	 this	 is	 simply	 a	 new	 ‘scramble	 for	Africa’	 with	 emerging	 donors	 like	 Brazil	 gaining	 access	 to	 Africa’s	 untapped	resources	 and	 using	 SSC	 as	 a	 foreign	 policy	 tool	 for	 its	 own	 strategic	 benefit.	While	 this	 latter	 option	 may	 seem	 quite	 a	 bold	 claim	 to	 make,	 based	 on	 the	outcome	 of	 just	 one	 case	 study,	 it	 draws	 attention	 to	 a	 bigger	 issue.	 As	developing	nations	 like	Brazil	continue	to	rise	and	establish	a	greater	presence	within	 the	 international	 community,	 it	 is	 important	 their	 relations	 with	 other	developing	nations	are	closely	monitored	and	scrutinised,	in	order	to	prevent	an	exploitation	 of	 resources,	 as	 we	 have	 seen	 between	 traditional	 North-South	relationships.	 It	 is	 this	 critical	 approach	 to	 SSC	 that	 has	 led	 to	 the	 decision	 to	study	ProSAVANA	in	this	thesis.			Although	 ProSAVANA	 is	 a	 SSC	 project,	 critics	 claim	 it	 offers	 little	 long-term	benefit	 for	 Mozambique,	 instead	 profiting	 private	 investors	 from	 Brazil	 and	Japan.	The	impact	of	this,	is	that	the	reputation	of	SSC	as	a	form	of	development	partnership	 between	 developing	 countries	 will	 be	 tarnished	 and	 the	 role	 of	Brazil	and	other	BRICS	nations	credited	with	leading	the	way	for	global	reform	
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and	 international	development,	will	 be	 exposed	as	using	development	projects	such	 as	 these,	 in	 order	 to	 benefit	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 weaker	 countries.	 By	analysing	 this	particular	case	study,	 this	 thesis	will	 look	at	 the	extent	 to	which	ProSAVANA	 actually	 benefits	 Mozambique	 and	 the	 long-term	 impact	 of	 this	heavily	criticised	project	on	SSC	as	a	future	tool	for	development	assistance	and	cooperation.	 This	 thesis	 concludes	 with	 the	 findings	 that	 ProSAVANA	 lacked	sufficient	 transparency	 and	 failed	 to	 address	 the	 concerns	 of	 local	 famers	 and	civil	society	groups,	leading	to	protests	and	negative	media	attention.	As	a	result,	many	of	the	private	investors	involved	in	the	project	have	attempted	to	distance	themselves,	in	order	to	avoid	tarnishing	their	own	reputation,	leading	to	a	lack	of	progress	in	reaching	the	targets	set	out	for	development.			While	 recognising	 the	 many	 successful	 SSC	 projects	 that	 have	 taken	 place	between	 Brazil	 and	 African	 nations	 and	 even	with	Mozambique	 itself	 in	 areas	such	as	health	and	education,	this	paper	offers	recommendations	for	improving	SSC	 projects	 in	 the	 future.	 These	 are	 increased	 transparency,	 ensuring	government	legislation	to	protect	locals	from	private	investment,	maintaining	an	open	dialogue	during	the	process,	in	order	to	address	concerns	immediately	and	avoid	 negative	 speculation,	 which	 as	 we	 saw	 in	 this	 case,	 can	 lead	 to	 halting	progress.	 Ultimately,	 this	 paper	 argues	 SSC	 is	 a	 welcome	 development	 to	 the	international	 development	 assistance	 arena,	 but	 it	 important	 it	 continues	 to	receive	adequate	scrutiny,	to	maintain	its	legitimacy	going	forward.			
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1.	Why	do	States	Offer	Development	Assistance?			In	 order	 to	 understand	 how	 successful	 efforts	 to	 transfer	 technical	 expertise	from	 Brazil	 to	 Africa	 have	 been,	 it	 is	 first	 important	 to	 look	 at	why	 Brazil	 is	seeking	to	cooperate	with	other	countries	and	share	its	knowledge.	While	there	are	many	theories	of	 interstate	cooperation	 that	would	attempt	 to	explain	 this,	the	following	chapter	shall	draw	on	the	academic	debate	from	leading	neoliberal	
institutionalist	 thinkers,	 as	 this	 theory	 has	 largely	 dominated	 explanations	 for	Western	 development	 assistance	 in	 the	 past.	 This	 will	 be	 compared	 with	 the	
Power	Asymmetries	Hypothesis,	which	helps	explain	the	more	recent	rise	of	SSC,	in	contrast	to	the	traditional	North-South,	donor-recipient	form	of	development	aid.	 Through	 a	 discussion	 of	 these	 theories,	 this	 chapter	 shall	 also	 define	 the	concept	 of	 SSC	 and	 review	 some	 of	 the	 leading	 academic	 debates	 surrounding	Brazil’s	use	of	SSC	as	a	foreign	policy	tool.				Before	discussing	why	states	offer	assistance,	it	is	first	important	to	define	what	exactly	 ‘development	 assistance’	 is.	 According	 to	 a	 report	 by	 the	World	 Bank	(2002:	 9),	 development	 assistance	 can	 encompass	 both	 financial	 and	 non-financial	instruments,	to	increase	growth	and	reduce	poverty.	Essentially,	while	the	transfer	of	 financial	resources	is	an	important	part	of	assistance,	so	too	are	countries	offering	advice,	analysis	and	capacity	building.	The	best	instrument	for	assistance	 will	 depend	 entirely	 on	 that	 country’s	 specific	 needs.	 This	 is	important,	as	in	recent	years	there	has	been	a	growing	debate	as	to	how	best	to	offer	 development	 assistance	 based	 on	 these	 instruments	 and	 has	 raised	 the	question	as	to	whether	financial	aid	really	‘works’.				There	have	been	many	 critics	of	 financial	 aid,	particularly	 those	who	 claim	 it’s	damaging	to	developing	countries	in	the	long	run,	who	become	‘aid	dependent’.	According	 to	 Clements	 et	 al.	 (2012:	 561),	 when	 the	 duration	 and	 amount	 of	financial	 aid	 is	 too	 high,	 it	 begins	 to	 have	 a	 negative	 impact	 on	 the	 recipient	country,	 due	 to	 the	 government	 relying	 on	 that	 source	 of	 income.	 In	 contrast,	Glassman	(2011)	claims	that	long-term	economic	aid	to	countries	like	Tanzania	has	 led	 to	 the	 successful	 development	 of	 roads,	 sanitation	 and	water	 projects,	
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with	 an	 estimated	 economic	 gain	 of	 well	 over	 $1	 billion.	 	 This	 debate	 over	whether	financial	aid	is	effective	and	similarly,	what	is	‘effective’	aid	has	surged	in	recent	years	and	has	fierce	proponents	on	either	side.	It	does	show	that	there	has	been	growing	interest	in	how	aid	is	delivered	and	what	are	the	best	practices	for	 different	 countries.	 With	 that	 in	 mind,	 this	 thesis	 shall	 now	 draw	 on	 two	major	 theories	 of	 international	 cooperation,	 in	 order	 to	understand	why	 states	offer	 assistance,	 before	 returning	 to	 the	 discussion	 of	 how	 best	 to	 provide	development	 aid	 and	more	 specifically,	 the	 rise	 of	 ‘needs	 based’	 development	assistance	in	the	form	of	SSC.					1.1	Neoliberal	Institutionalism	vs	The	Power	Asymmetries			Hypothesis		One	of	 the	 leading	 theories	of	 international	 cooperation	comes	 from	neoliberal	institutionalism.	Leading	Neo-Liberal	 Institutionalist	 thinkers,	 such	as	Keohane		&	Nye	 (2001:	 23)	 argue	 that	 international	 institutions	 can	 increase	 inter-state	cooperation	 and	 facilitate	mutual	 gains.	 This	 counters	 the	 neorealist	 argument	that	the	anachronistic	nature	of	the	international	community	makes	cooperation	unlikely.	 	 An	 example	 of	 an	 institution	 that	 increases	 inter-state	 cooperation	would	be	 the	Development	Assistance	Committee	 (DAC),	which	was	developed	as	a	way	to	distribute	aid	to	poor	countries.	The	desired	result	of	this	foreign	aid	is	 repeated	 cooperation	 and	 interaction	 between	 nation	 states,	which	 leads	 to	mutually	beneficial	arrangements.	However,	given	that	these	aid	practices	have	been	taking	place	for	over	fifty	years	and	relatively	little	improvement	in	many	African	countries	has	occurred,	one	must	question	how	effective	these	mutually	beneficial	arrangements	really	are.			A	common	theme	of	development	assistance	through	DAC	members	is	providing	aid	with	conditionalities	attached,	such	as	adopting	neoliberal	economic	policies	or	 promoting	 a	 more	 transparent	 government.	 The	 result	 of	 these	 recipient	countries	adopting	the	conditionalities	often	benefits	the	donor’s	through	access	to	resources,	but	has	clearly	not	led	to	significant	economic	growth	domestically.		
	 9	
	This	 has	 led	many	 to	 criticise	 this	 neoliberal	 institutionalist	 form	 of	 providing	development	assistance.	According	 to	Howard	 (2014:	3)	nations	are	motivated	to	give	aid	based	on	economic	self-interest.	This	would	offer	one	explanation	as	to	why	 aid	 institutions	 like	 the	 DAC	 are	 created	 and	why	 countries	 choose	 to	offer	 assistance	 to	 other	 states.	 It	 would	 also	 explain	 the	 imbalance	 that	 is	prevalent	through	this	form	of	assistance.	As	mentioned	previously,	despite	over	fifty	 years	 of	 development	 assistance	 from	 DAC	 members,	 many	 recipient	countries	remain	in	very	poor	conditions	and	the	economic	gains	appear	to	have	been	reaped	by	those	providing	the	assistance.			The	impact	of	this	has	been	a	rise	in	a	different	form	of	development	assistance.	Alongside	 the	 wealthy	 countries	 in	 the	 global	 North,	 providing	 assistance	through	 institutions	 like	 the	 DAC,	 there	 have	 been	 a	 growing	 number	 of	developing	 countries	 in	 the	 South,	 offering	 development	 assistance	 to	 fellow	global	South	partners,	without	the	conditionalities	and	with	a	long-term	goal	of	
mutual	development.	This	 is	known	as	South-South	Cooperation	 (SSC)	and	 can	be	 defined	 as	 the	 mutual	 sharing	 and	 exchange	 of	 development	 solutions	between	 countries	 in	 the	 global	 South	 (OECD	 2011:2).	 It	 is	 very	 important	 to	make	the	distinction	here	between	traditional	North-South	‘aid’	and	South-South	‘cooperation’	as	much	of	the	discourse	surrounding	SSC	rejects	the	terms	‘donor’	and	 ‘recipient’.	Rather	 than	a	 top-down	approach,	SSC	 is	more	horizontal,	with	countries	mutually	benefiting	from	an	exchange	that	results	in	development	for	all	parties	 involved,	with	 little	 interference	 in	domestic	affairs	(Zimmermann	&	Smith	2011:	724-732).	That	being	said,	SSC	involves	a	more	developed	country,	in	 this	 instance	 Brazil,	 helping	 a	 less	 developed	 country,	 Mozambique.	 It’s	important	to	mention	that	while	the	aim	might	be	horizontal	cooperation,	there	is	always	going	to	be	one	country	that	benefits	more	through	this	interaction	and	that	is	what	this	case	study	of	ProSAVANA	will	investigate.					While	 neoliberalism	 offers	 a	 solid	 framework	 for	 understanding	 inter-state	cooperation,	other	 theories	have	been	developed	 to	 further	explain	 this	 rise	of	
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SSC	and	the	growing	inequality	that	comes	as	a	result	of	traditional	North-South	development	aid.	Milner	(1992)	provides	a	thorough	review	of	the	literature	on	international	cooperation	and	discusses	one	hypothesis	in	particular,	the	Power	
Asymmetries	Hypothesis.	This	theory	suggests	imbalances	in	power,	usually	in	the	form	of	hierarchies,	are	common	in	inter-state	cooperation.	 ‘These	differences	in	
influence	 allow	 stronger	 actors	 the	 greater	 role	 in	 organizing	 the	 system…with	
stronger	actors	obtaining	more	favourable	terms’	(Milner	1992:	480).	This	would	provide	 a	 good	 framework	 for	 understanding	 the	 political	 conditionality’s	generally	tied	with	foreign	aid	from	traditional	donors.	For	example,	in	2007,	the	European	 Commission	 introduced	 the	 Governance	 Incentive	 Tranche,	 which	‘topped	 up’	 the	 aid	 to	 a	 recipient	 country,	 if	 it’s	 government	 was	 willing	 to	negotiate	with	the	EU	to	implement	democratic	reforms	(Molenaers,	Dellepiane	&	Faust	2015:	2).	This	example	supports	the	hypothesis	that	power	imbalances	between	economically	stronger	EU	countries	and	the	recipient	nations,	allowed	the	 EU	 to	 play	 a	 greater	 role	 in	 the	 foreign	 aid	 system	 and	 ensure	 the	 terms	favoured	the	EU	more.			Applying	the	Power	Asymmetries	Hypothesis	can	help	us	to	understand	the	rise	in	 SSC	 from	 a	 theoretical	 perspective.	 The	 discourse	 surrounding	 SSC	 moves	away	 from	 the	 unequal	 exchange	 tied	 with	 conditionality’s,	 as	 evident	 in	 the	example	 above,	 and	 gravitates	 towards	 a	 more	 balanced	 engagement	 with	mutual	goals.	Purushothaman	(2014:	3-5)	claims	the	theoretical	impetus	for	SSC	came	 from	 dependency	 theorists,	 who	 elaborated	 their	 ideas	 in	 the	 Latin	American	 context.	 During	 the	 immediate	 post-Cold	 War	 era,	 when	 economic	growth	 in	 some	 Global	 South	 countries	 began	 to	 overtake	 some	 Northern	countries,	for	example	the	economic	growth	of	India	and	China.	These	‘emerging	donors’	began	offering	assistance	at	a	regional	 level,	referring	to	themselves	as	development	partners,	rather	than	donors,	thus	moving	away	from	the	colonial	connotations	 associated	 with	 the	 traditional	 donor-recipient	 relationship.	 The	underlying	principle	of	SSC	is	to	support	each	other	for	a	win-win	partnership	on	all	 sides,	 which	 would	 certainly	 contrast	 that	 of	 the	 Power	 Asymmetries	hypothesis.	It	is	within	this	line	of	thought	that	has	led	to	choosing	to	analyse	the	effectiveness	 of	 SSC	 between	 Brazil	 and	 Mozambique.	 By	 applying	 the	 Power	
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Asymmetries	 hypothesis	 and	 combining	 it	 with	 SSC,	 one	 would	 assume	 that	Brazil,	being	the	stronger	nation,	would	not	manipulate	the	cooperative	project	ProSAVANA	 to	 its	 own	 advantage	 as	 that	 would	 imply	 SSC	 is	 no	 different	 to	traditional	 aid	 projects.	 By	 analysing	 the	 case	 study	 of	 ProSAVANA	 it	 will	 be	possible	to	see	whether	this	is	the	case	and	therefore	discuss	the	effectiveness	of	SSC	as	a	new	model	of	development	assistance.			 	
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2.	Methodology		In	order	for	this	thesis	to	effectively	analyse	whether	the	agricultural	successes	achieved	by	Brazil’s	Embrapa	can	be	replicated	in	Africa	through	SSC,	this	thesis	will	use	a	single,	 in-depth	case	study	analysis	as	 its	methodological	 framework.	The	 case	 study	 used	 will	 be	 ‘ProSAVANA’,	 a	 form	 of	 Triangular	 Cooperation	between	 Japan,	Brazil	and	Mozambique.	This	combination	of	 financial	aid	 from	Japan	 combined	 with	 expert	 technical	 knowledge	 transfer	 from	 Brazil	 to	Mozambique,	will	allow	this	paper	 to	adequately	asses	 the	effectiveness	of	 this	method	of	SSC.	Based	on	the	findings	of	this	case	study,	this	thesis	will	be	able	to	make	 claims	 regarding	 SSC	 and	 its	 ability	 to	 provide	 a	 different	 form	 of	development	assistance	 to	 its	Southern	partners	based	on	 technical	knowledge	and	the	partner	countries	needs.			According	to	Yin	(1994:	23),	a	case	study	is	‘an	empirical	inquiry	that	investigates	
a	 contemporary	 phenomenon	 within	 its	 real	 life	 context;	 when	 the	 boundaries	
between	phenomenon	and	 context	are	not	 clearly	 evident;	 and	 in	which	multiple	
sources	of	evidence	are	used’.	For	the	purpose	of	this	thesis,	due	to	limitations	on	word	length	and	availability	of	resources,	a	single	case	study	method,	rather	than	a	 large-N	 cross-case	 method,	 is	 the	 most	 viable	 option.	 There	 are	 of	 course,	certain	 factors	 that	 must	 be	 addressed,	 regarding	 case	 selection	 and	generalisation	of	findings,	based	on	a	single	case.			Given	this	paper	 is	specifically	addressing	whether	the	success	of	Embrapa	can	be	 replicated	 in	 Africa	 through	 SSC,	 the	 case	 selection	 began	 by	 using	 Klotz	(2009)	 method	 of	 defining	 the	 concepts	 that	 this	 paper	 is	 researching.	‘Agricultural	success’	 is	very	difficult	 to	conceptualise,	 therefore	this	paper	will	use	 Embrapa’s	 ‘technical	 cooperation’	 to	 incorporate	 SSC	 and	 agricultural	projects	 under	 Embrapa.	 This	 technical	 cooperation	 can	 be	 defined	 as	 ‘an	
instrument	of	the	Brazilian	Government	to	support	capacity	building	activities	and	
technology	transfer	in	developing	countries’	(Embrapa	2016).	According	to	Klotz,	once	this	concept	 is	defined,	the	researcher	 is	 left	with	a	 ‘universe	of	cases’	 that	most	suitably	apply	to	what	it	is	being	studied.	Those	cases	that	do	not	match	the	
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concept	 the	 researcher	 has	 defined	 are	 deemed	 ‘non-cases’	 and	 are	 unsuitable	for	study.	This	application	will	avoid	stretching	concepts	and	help	generalise	the	findings	 later	 (Klotz	 2009:	 18).	 In	 this	 instance,	 the	 transformation	 of	 the	Brazilian	 Cerrado	 region,	 its	 own	 ‘Savannah’,	which	was	 previously	 unsuitable	for	 farming,	 is	widely	considered	a	major	success	and	has	played	an	enormous	part	 in	 Brazil’s	 agricultural	 development.	 The	 Cerrado	 now	 produces	 70%	 of	Brazil’s	 agricultural	 output,	 thus	 makes	 for	 a	 suitable	 study	 when	 analysing	whether	 it	can	be	successfully	replicated	 in	Mozambique	as	a	 form	of	 technical	cooperation	in	tropical	agriculture	(Piaui,	The	Economist,	26/08/2010).			When	selecting	a	particular	case	study,	it	 is	 important	to	address	the	issue	that	this	 individual	 case	 will	 represent	 a	 range	 of	 cases,	 despite	 the	 fact	generalization	 as	 a	 result	 of	 one	 individual	 case	 study’s	 findings	 are	 often	delivered	 in	 a	 tentative	 fashion	 (Seawright	 	&	 	Gerring	2008:	294).	 If	 this	 case	study	supports	the	hypothesis	that	SSC	can	replicate	the	agricultural	success	of	Brazil	 in	 Africa,	 in	 this	 instance	 if	 the	 success	 of	 the	 Brazilian	 Cerrado	 can	 be	replicated	in	Mozambique’s	Savannah,	one	could	argue	that	this	case	represents	the	possibility	 to	 replicate	 a	 range	 of	 agricultural	 successes	 achieved	 in	Brazil,	across	African	states	in	the	future.		There	have	already	been	several	case	studies	conducted	on	ProSAVANA	and	analysis	of	the	discourse	surrounding	the	project,	so	 this	 paper	will	 use	 data	 from	 these	 studies,	 combined	with	 primary	 source	information	taken	from	the	ProSAVANA	website,	which	contains	original	copies	of	stakeholder	meetings,	project	plans	and	funding	allocations.	This	thesis	shall	also	analyse	the	critical	discourse	surrounding	ProSAVANA,	put	forward	by	civil	society	groups	and	 its	coverage	 in	 the	media.	Due	 to	some	original	documents,	such	 as	 the	 amended	Master	 Plan	 (2015)	 being	 presented	 in	 Portuguese,	 this	thesis	does	rely	on	translations	from	previous	studies	and	interviews	with	local	farmers	 in	 Mozambique	 conducted	 by	 other	 researchers.	 	 Having	 now	established	 the	 theoretical	 framework	 from	 the	 debate	 surrounding	 SSC	 and	discussed	how	 the	case	 study	analysis	will	be	 carried	out,	 the	next	part	of	 this	thesis	shall	provide	some	context	to	the	ProSAVANA	project	and	discuss	Brazil’s	role	as	a	provider	of	development	assistance.		
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3.	Brazil	and	its	History	of	South-South	Cooperation		Brazil	has	been	providing	development	assistance	 for	over	 forty	years.	Despite	this,	much	of	the	literature	still	refers	to	Brazil	as	an	‘emerging	donor’	given	that	its	is	not	part	of	the	DAC.	According	to	Weinstock	&	Cabral	(2010:	64-66),	Brazil	provides	an	estimated	$1	billion	 in	development	assistance	annually;	placing	 it	above	 DAC	 donors	 like	 Finland	 and	 Portugal.	 Weinstock	 &	 Cabral	 also	 link	Brazil’s	 aid	 strategy	 with	 the	 emergence	 of	 trilateral/triangular	 cooperation,	which	 involves	 three	 countries	 working	 together:	 a	 traditional	 DAC	 donor	providing	 financial	 aid,	 a	 pivotal	 country	 such	 as	 Brazil	 providing	 technical	assistance	 and	 a	 donor	 recipient.	 This	 trilateral/triangular	 cooperation	will	 be	discussed	in	more	detail	later,	but	one	of	the	major	strengths	of	emerging	donors	providing	 development	 assistance	 is	 the	 ability	 to	 offer	 technical	 assistance	based	 on	 their	 own	 experiences	 as	 a	 recipient	 themselves	 or	 due	 to	circumstantial	similarities	between	them	and	the	partner	country.			According	 to	 Schlager	 (2007),	 ‘Brazil	 works	 consistently	 as	 an	 advocate	 and	
initiator	 of	 South-South	 cooperation	 in	 the	 interest	 of	 the	global	 South…In	many	
sectors	 Brazil	 has	 also	 built	 expertise	 of	 its	 own,	 which	 can	 be	 used	 by	 other	
countries	 as	 a	 guideline	 for	 action	 designed	 to	 improve	 socioeconomic	
development’	 	 (Schlager	 2007:	 3).	 Brazil	 has	 assumed	 this	 role	 as	 a	 leading	advocate	of	the	global	South,	 identifying	 itself	as	a	 link	between	developed	and	developing	countries,	yet	has	also	received	criticism	for	its	motives	behind	this.	Stolte	 (2012:	 3-5)	 analyses	 Brazil’s	 increasing	 engagement	with	 Africa,	 having	doubled	 its	diplomatic	presence	 from	17	 to	37	embassies	and	 increasing	 trade	from	$4.2	billion	to	$27.6	billion	over	the	past	decade,	making	it	is	a	key	driver	behind	 SSC	 projects	 in	 Africa.	However,	 Stolte	 also	 claims	 this	 is	 due	 to	 Brazil	seeking	African	support	for	a	permanent	UN	Security	Council	seat	and	using	its	policies	 in	 Africa	 to	 strengthen	 its	 reputation	 as	 a	major	 global	 power.	 This	 is	interesting,	as	this	paper	seeks	to	investigate	the	effectiveness	of	ProSAVANA	in	benefiting	all	countries	involved.	The	fact	that	Brazil	 is	claimed	to	have	its	own	motives	 behind	 cooperative	 projects	with	 Africa,	 other	 than	 simply	 increasing	development	 could	 help	 explain	 why	 ProSAVANA	 has	 received	 such	 criticism,	
	 15	
but	 this	 will	 be	 discussed	 in	 more	 detail	 following	 the	 case	 study	 section.	 In	order	to	better	understand	Brazil’s	cooperation	with	Africa,	we	must	look	at	its	previous	involvement	in	the	continent	and	how	successful	its	other	development	projects	have	been.			3.1	Brazil’s	Presence	in	Africa		
The	 Agencia	 Brasileira	 de	 Cooperacao	 (ABC)	 was	 created	 in	 1987,	 with	 the	primary	 aim	 of	 improving	 the	 management	 and	 coordination	 of	 the	 Official	Development	Aid	 (ODA)	 received	 by	Brazil.	However,	 in	 recent	 years,	 the	ABC	has	become	a	development	provider	in	the	international	development	landscape.	John	de	Sousa	 (2008:	2)	 comments	on	Brazil’s	 increased	SSC	engagement	with	Africa	since	2003	and	claims	this	is	largely	due	to	its	close	historical	and	cultural	ties	 with	 the	 region,	 as	 well	 as	 sharing	 similar	 development	 challenges	 with	many	African	 countries	 as	 a	 result	 of	 similar	 climate,	 environmental,	 linguistic	and	 social	 conditions.	 This	 would	 support	 Mawdsley’s	 (2012:	 64)	 claim	 that	emerging	donors	often	provide	technical	expertise	that	suits	the	recipients	needs	better,	 due	 to	 sharing	 similar	 circumstances	 and	 having	 experienced	 similar	challenges.			Unlike	 China,	 Brazil’s	 development	 assistance	 provided	 by	 the	 ABC	 does	 not	generally	 involve	 hard	 infrastructure,	 rather	 its	 main	 focus	 is	 on	 skills	development,	strengthening	institutional	capacity	and	sharing	of	best	practices,	primarily	 in	 health,	 agriculture,	 education	 and	 social	 policies	 (Alves	 2013:	 2).	These	are	areas	 that	Brazil	has	achieved	domestic	success	 in	reforming	and	 its	Southern	 partners	 have	 recognized	 this.	 These	 reforms	 have	 provided	 Brazil	with	 technical	 expertise	 that	 it	 can	 export	 to	 other	 countries	 as	 part	 of	 its	development	 cooperation	 projects.	 A	 good	 example	 of	 this	 is	 Brazil’s	 technical	cooperation	 in	 the	 health	 sector.	 Russo	&	 Shankland	 (2013:	 102)	 discuss	 how	Brazil	 made	 a	 concerted	 effort	 to	 increase	 public	 spending	 to	 improve	 its	domestic	 health	 policies,	 providing	 around	 80%	 of	 the	 population	 with	 free	health	 care.	 These	 movements,	 such	 as	 the	 ‘Movement	 for	 Health	 Reform’	(1988),	saw	a	coordinated	effort	to	develop	an	adequate	national	health	system	
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and	 overcome	major	 health	 issues	 facing	 its	 citizens	 at	 the	 time.	 Its	 control	 of	diseases	 such	 as	 cholera	 and	 diarrhea	 and	 its	 stabilization	 of	 the	 HIV/AIDS	epidemic	 is	 an	 example	 of	 Brazil	 successful	 efforts	 to	 improve	 the	 living	conditions	of	its	own	citizens.	Having	achieved	success	in	meeting	its	own	health	targets,	Brazil	 then	began	 to	expand	 this	effort	 to	 tackle	major	health	 issues	at	the	 regional	 and	 global	 level,	 leading	 to	 increased	 technical	 cooperation	 with	other	nations.		3.2	Brazil-Africa	Technical	Cooperation	Projects				Unlike	traditional	DAC	donor	aid	programs	that	simply	provided	aid,	Brazil	used	SSC	 as	 a	 way	 to	 transfer	 technical	 and	 scientific	 knowledge	 it	 had	 gained	domestically	when	tackling	health	issues	like	HIV/AIDS,	to	African	nations	such	as	Mozambique,	Nigeria	&	Angola	 (Lee	&	Gomez	2011:	64).	Using	 the	Oswaldo	Cruz	Foundation	 (Fiocruz),	 an	 institution	 that	has	been	 in	place	 in	Brazil	 since	1900	 develop	 technical	 expertise	 in	 public	 health,	 Brazil	 was	 able	 to	 develop	‘focal	points’	to	assist	other	Portuguese	speaking	nations	in	the	development	of	health	 policies.	 This	 is	 in	 line	 with	 the	 neoliberal	 institutionalist	 theory	 of	cooperation,	 using	 an	 institution	 like	Fiocruz	 to	 facilitate	 cooperation	 between	Brazil	and	other	African	nations.	The	community	of	Portuguese	speaking	nations,	
Comunidade	 de	 Paises	 de	 Lingua	 (CPLP)	 were	 able	 to	 develop	 agreements	 on	tackling	HIV/AIDS,	malaria	and	medical	visa’s	based	on	the	success	of	treatment	in	 these	areas	already	developed	 in	Brazil.	This	cooperation	was	not	 limited	 to	just	health	however,	with	education	and	environmental	policies	also	being	made	a	priority	(Almedia	et	al.	2010:	27).			What	makes	this	cooperation	between	Brazil	and	Africa	distinctive	compared	to	traditional	 DAC	 assistance,	 is	 its	 focus	 on	 strengthening	 the	 partner	 country’s	institutional	 capacity.	The	 receiving	 countries	 greatly	 appreciate	Brazil	 sharing	its	knowledge	based	on	its	own	experiences	in	overcoming	the	same	challenges	and	 have	 welcomed	 this	 technical	 cooperation,	 coupled	 with	 investment	 in	institutional	 development,	 such	 as	 capacity	 building	 courses	 in	 Lusophone	nations	and	in	Mozambique,	the	creation	of	the	Teenage	Health	Institute	and	the	
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development	of	an	antiretroviral	drug	factory	(Chagas	2013).	The	strengthening	of	 institutional	 capacity	 in	 developing	 countries	 is	 vital	 to	 their	 long-term	development	and	makes	them	less	dependent	on	aid	in	the	future.	Having	made	great	progress	in	this	area	of	health	development,	this	paper	shall	now	begin	to	look	at	how	Brazil	continued	to	transfer	its	knowledge	and	expertise,	within	the	agricultural	sector.	However	in	order	to	understand	the	challenges	Mozambique	faces	and	its	current	institutional	capacity	in	areas	like	agricultural	research	and	development,	 the	 next	 section	 will	 provide	 a	 brief	 overview	 of	 Mozambique’s	agricultural	sector	and	domestic	efforts	to	improve	it,	which	led	to	the	decision	taken	 by	Brazil	 to	 offer	 a	 triangular	 cooperation	 project	 to	 help	 transform	 the	Nacala	Corridor.			3.3	Mozambique’s	Agricultural	Struggles		Agriculture	 is	 the	 backbone	 of	 the	 Mozambican	 economy.	 Its	 population	 is	around	 23	million,	 of	which	 69%	depend	 on	 agriculture	 for	 their	 employment	and	livelihoods	(Chilonda	et	al.	2011:	7).	In	order	to	tackle	poverty	reduction	and	stimulate	sustainable	economic	growth	in	the	country,	it	is	vital	the	agricultural	sector	 is	 improved.	The	Mozambican	government	has	always	made	agricultural	development	 a	 priority.	 In	 1998,	 the	 government	 launched	 the	 Agricultural	Sector	Expenditure	Program	(PROAGRI	I),	which	was	designed	to	improve	public	expenditure,	 secure	 environmentally	 sustainable	 growth,	 reduce	 poverty	 and	improve	 food	 security	 (World	Bank	1990:	2).	Although	PROAGRI	had	 the	 right	goals	 in	 mind,	 it	 lacked	 a	 clear	 policy	 and	 expenditure	 framework,	 as	 well	 as	insufficient	major	stakeholders	and	resources	in	agriculture.	In	2005,	PROAGRI	II	was	 introduced	 as	 an	 improved	 version.	 The	 impact	 of	 PROAGRI	 II	 was	 an	increased	 role	 of	 government	 in	 the	 agricultural	 sector	 and	 better	communication	and	cooperation	with	small-scale	farmers	(Cabral,	Shrivastava	&	Muendane	2007:	7).	That	being	said,	PROAGRI	II	was	criticized	for	focusing	too	much	 on	 building	 financial	 management	 and	 planning	 systems	 within	 the	Ministry	of	Agriculture	and	not	providing	enough	attention	to	actually	ensuring	this	made	a	positive	 impact	at	 the	 field	 level.	Essentially	 it	had	good	 ideas	and	goals	in	theory,	but	failed	to	implement	these	in	practice.		
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	In	2007,	the	lack	of	tangible	results	from	the	PROAGRI	projects,	combined	with	the	 global	 financial	 crisis	 meant	 food	 shortages	 were	 increasing	 and	 decisive	action	 was	 needed.	 The	 Ministry	 of	 Agriculture,	 under	 President	 Guebuza,	responded	to	this	crisis	by	launching	the	Green	Revolution	Strategy	(Ministry	of	Agriculture	2010:	1).	India	famously	adopted	its	own	Green	Revolution	strategy	in	the	1960’s	when	facing	similar	food	shortages	and	this	was	largely	recognized	as	a	great	success	in	helping	it	quickly	achieve	food	self-sufficiency	(Fujita	2010:	3).	The	Mozambican	Green	Revolution	set	out	very	similar	goals	to	those	of	India	in	the	1960’s,	with	its	primary	objectives	set	out	to	increase	growth	of	small	and	medium-scale	 producers	 and	 increasing	 food	 supply	 through	 sustainable	measures.	These	objectives	were	to	be	achieved	through:	improved	technologies,	utilizing	 natural	 resources,	 formation	 of	 human	 and	 social	 capital	 and	development	of	up-to-date	information	(Ministry	of	Agriculture	2010:	8).			As	 part	 of	 its	 Green	 Revolution,	 Mozambique	 signed	 the	 G8	 New	 Alliance	 for	Food	Security	&	Nutrition	(NAFSN)	in	2012,	which	aims	to	increase	the	private	sector’s	 role	 in	 achieving	 the	 African	 Union’s	 ‘Comprehensive	 African	Agricultural	 Development	 Program’	 (CAADP).	 This	 program	 is	 committed	 to	promoting	competitive	private	sector	input	markets,	reforming	land	use	rights	to	promote	private	sector	investment,	liberalizing	agricultural	marketing	and	trade	and	increasing	farmers	access	to	credit	(African	Centre	for	Biodiversity	2015:	6-7).	Following	a	UN	General	Assembly	meeting	in	2008,	the	 ‘African	Agricultural	Growth	Corridor’	was	proposed	as	a	method	of	converting	millions	of	hectares	of	land	 to	 industrial	 agriculture,	 through	 the	 building	 of	 infrastructure,	 led	 by	private	 companies.	 ‘It	refers	to	the	regions	of	Africa	whose	agricultural	potential	
has	 not	 been	 realized	 and	 whose	 population	 remains	 almost	 entirely	 reliant	 on	
subsistence	 agriculture’	 (Paul	 &	 Steinbrecher	 2013:	 2).	 One	 of	 the	 major	providers	 of	 funding	 under	 NAFSN	 is	 Japan	 and	 under	 the	 Nacala	 Corridor	Project,	which	 is	 part	 of	 the	African	Agricultural	Growth	Corridor,	 ProSAVANA	was	developed	as	a	private	 investment	opportunity.	The	 following	chapter	will	provide	 a	 case	 study	 analysis	 of	 ProSAVANA,	 discussing	 the	 objectives	 of	 the	
	 19	
project,	along	with	a	discussion	on	 its	effectiveness	and	 implications	 for	 future	agricultural	development	in	Mozambique.																															
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4.	Case	Study:	ProSAVANA			ProSAVANA	is	a	Triangular	Cooperation	Program	for	Agricultural	Development	of	 the	African	Tropical	 Savannah	 in	Mozambique.	 It	was	 launched	 in	2009	and	the	three	countries	that	make	up	this	‘triangle’	are	Japan,	Brazil	and	Mozambique	(Roman-Alcala	Okada	2015:8).	The	way	a	triangular	cooperation	program	works	is	 fairly	 straightforward.	 This	 relatively	 recent	 mode	 of	 development	cooperation	involves	a	traditional	donor	from	the	OECD/DAC	club,	an	emerging	‘global	 South’	 donor,	 and	 a	 recipient	 country.	 The	 idea	 behind	 triangular	cooperation	is	enabling	technical	cooperation	and	knowledge	transfer,	based	on	the	 successful	 cooperation	 between	 previous	 donors	 and	 recipients	 (Ashoff	2010:	22-24).			When	 Embrapa	was	 created	 in	 Brazil	 in	 1973,	 one	 of	 its	 biggest	 projects	was	PROCEDER	a	project,	which	saw	the	transformation	of	 the	Brazilian	Cerrado.	A	tropical	 savanna	 that	 was	 infertile	 due	 to	 its	 high	 soil	 acidity	 levels	 and	 high	levels	of	aluminum.	The	Plinio	Souza	of	the	Agricultural	Research	Centre	for	the	Cerrado	 (CPAC)	 was	 created	 specifically	 to	 address	 these	 issues	 and	 conduct	research	 and	 development	 to	 overcome	 these	 obstacles.	 CPAC	 received	tremendous	 financial	 assistance	 from	 Japan	 during	 this	 period	 and	 after	attempts	to	grow	various	different	crops	and	grains	in	the	Cerrado,	CPAC	created	the	 DOKO,	 which	 was	 a	 tropical	 soybean	 capable	 of	 growing	 in	 the	 region.	Although	the	soybean	can	generally	grow	in	unfavorable	conditions	anyway,	this	was	 a	 major	 breakthrough	 and	 soybean	 production	 began	 to	 increase	 very	quickly	 in	 Brazil.	 Today,	 the	 Brazilian	 Cerrado	 is	 a	 leading	 producer	 of	 the	world’s	 soybeans	 providing	 24.8%	 of	 global	 soybean	 production	 (Masuda	 &	Goldsmith	2009:	145).			Today,	 Mozambique	 faces	 similar	 challenges	 to	 Brazil	 in	 the	 1970’s,	 with	 low	agricultural	 production	 and	 food	 shortages;	Mozambique	 desperately	 needs	 to	undergo	a	major	agricultural	transformation.	The	Nacala	Corridor	is	the	largest	of	 six	 agricultural	 corridors	 in	 the	 country,	 which	 shares	 similar	 land	characteristics	to	the	Brazilian	Cerrado	and	it	is	this	area	that	will	be	developed	
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under	the	ProSAVANA	project,	in	an	attempt	to	cultivate	it	in	much	the	same	way	Brazil	did	to	its	Cerrado.			The	 ProSAVANA	 project	 involves	 three	 nations,	 each	 of	 which	 providing	 their	own	 institutions	 to	 oversee	 the	 operation.	 Japan’s	 institution	 is	 JICA	 (Japan	International	Cooperation	Agency)	this	is	the	official	Japanese	institution	behind	all	of	its	official	development	aid	and	technical	cooperation	(JICA	2016).	Brazil’s	ABC	is	its	own	national	equivalent.	As	discussed	earlier,	this	institution	controls	aid	 and	 technical	 cooperation	 to	 partner	 countries,	 as	well	 as	 the	 funds	 it	 still	receives	 from	 DAC	 donor	 countries.	 Of	 course,	 the	 other	 Brazilian	 institution	involved	is	Embrapa,	which	has	the	primary	purpose	of	providing	knowledge	of	tropical	 savannah	 agriculture.	 Finally,	 Mozambique’s	 institution	 is	 the	 IIAM	(Institute	of	Agrarian	Investigation	of	Mozambique),	which	is	part	of	the	Ministry	of	 Agriculture	 in	 Mozambique.	 These	 institutions	 all	 work	 together	 under	 the	Joint	 Coordination	 Committee	 (JCC),	 a	 decision	 making	 body	 representing	 the	interests	of	 all	 three	 countries	 involved	 (Chichava	et	al.	 2013:	12).	Once	again,	the	creation	of	institutions	to	foster	and	maintain	cooperation	fits	nicely	within	the	framework	of	neoliberal	institutionalism.					The	ProSAVANA	Program	is	divided	into	three	main	components:	The	first	is	the	
Projecto	 de	 Investigacao	 (PI)	 and	 its	 primary	 aim	 is	 the	 improvement	 of	 the	research	 capacity	 of	 Mozambican	 institutions.	 The	 second	 component	 is	 the	
Plano	 Director	 (PD),	 which	 involves	 the	 formulation	 of	 an	 Agriculture	Development	Master	Plan	and	finally	the	Projecto	de	Extensao	(PE).	This	involves	the	 improvement	 of	 the	 rural	 extension	 and	 technical	 assistance	 capacity	 of	Mozambican	 institutions	(Campos	2012:	20).	This	case	study	shall	outline	each	of	these	three	key	components	of	the	project,	looking	at	the	objectives,	timeline	and	funding	of	each	component,	before	moving	on	to	a	discussion	of	their	impact	and	effectiveness.						 	
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4.1	Improvement	of	the	Research	Capacity	of	Mozambican	Institutions	(PI)		The	 ProSAVANA	 PI	 project	 was	 designed	 to	 run	 from	 2011-2015,	 however	 it	ended	up	 taking	until	March	2016.	 Its	objective	was	 to	 improve	Mozambique’s	domestic	research	capabilities	and	this	was	to	be	achieved	through	the	creation	of	 two	 new	 research	 laboratories,	 establishing	 a	 database	 of	 agricultural	information	and	development	of	mechanisms	to	distribute	the	new	information	and	 new	 technologies	 to	 farmers.	 	 The	 funding	 for	 the	 PI	 component	 of	 the	project	 can	 be	 broken	 down	 as	 follows:	 42.1%	 came	 from	 the	 Brazilian	 ABC,	43.8%	 came	 from	 Embrapa	 and	 the	 remaining	 14.1%	 came	 from	 the	Mozambican	government	itself	(Ekman	&	Macamo	2014:	8).			A	 more	 detailed	 description	 of	 exactly	 how	 the	 strengthening	 of	 research	capabilities	was	 achieved	under	 the	PI	 project	 are	provided	by	 the	Ministry	 of	Agriculture	&	Food	Security	of	Mozambique	(MASA	2016):		
• Strengthening	 the	 operational	 capacity	 of	 IIAM	 Northeast	 &	 Northwest	research	 centers.	This	will	 be	 achieved	 through	 training	of	 IIAM	staff	 at	experimental	 stations	 in	 Lichinga	 and	 Nampula,	 modernization	 of	infrastructure	 and	 equipment	 and	 implementing	 research	 programs	 in	the	region.		
• Development	of	soil	improvement	technologies	for	agricultural	use	in	the	Nacala	Corridor.		
• Appropriate	 development	 of	 cultivation	 technologies	 and	 livestock	production	of	the	Nacala	Corridor.		
• Evaluation	of	 natural	 resources	 and	 the	 environmental	 impact	 resulting	from	 the	 use	 of	 new	 agricultural	 technologies	 and	 socio-economic	conditions	in	the	Nacala	Corridor.		
• Development	 of	 a	 ‘Decision	 Support	Model’	 designed	 for	 farmers	 to	 use	when	selecting	an	appropriate	cropping	system.				As	we	 can	 see,	 the	 PI	 project	 is	 split	 between	 strengthening	 local	 research	capacity	and	passing	this	technology	on	to	the	farmers	to	use	effectively.		
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4.2	Support	of	the	Agricultural	Development	Master	Plan	(PD)		The	ProSAVANA	PD	project	was	designed	to	create	an	agricultural	‘Master	Plan’,	which	 contributes	 to	 social	 and	 economic	 development,	 by	 engaging	 private	investment	to	promote	sustainable	production	systems	and	poverty	reduction	in	the	Nacala	Corridor	(Ikegami	2015:	9).	It	began	in	2012	and	has	two	phases,	the	first	from	2012-2013	was	designed	to	research	and	develop	the	Master	Plan.	The	second	phase	from	2013-2030	is	to	mobilize	public	and	private	capital	to	finance	the	implementation	of	the	Master	Plan	and	its	associated	projects.	According	to	Ekman	 &	Macamo	 (2014),	 unlike	 the	 PI	 project	 that	 was	 primarily	 funded	 by	Brazil,	 the	 PD	 project	 receives	 most	 of	 its	 budget	 from	 Japan.	 Mozambique	provides	 $300,000,	 Brazil	 provides	 $800,000	 and	 Japan	 provides	 $6,254,000	(Ekman	&	Macamo	2014:	 8).	 This	 breakdown	 of	 figures	 also	 shows	 us	 exactly	how	 this	 triangular	 cooperation	works,	with	 Japan	providing	 the	 largest	 funds,	Brazil	 providing	 a	 combination	 of	 lesser	 funds	 along	 with	 considerable	knowledge	 and	 technological	 experience	 and	 Mozambique	 as	 the	 ‘recipient’	nation.			In	2013,	a	draft	of	the	Master	Plan	was	leaked.	The	objectives	of	this	Master	Plan	were	to	increase	the	agricultural	productivity	of	small	and	medium	sized	farms	and	 to	 maximize	 the	 impact	 of	 this	 increased	 productivity	 on	 the	 regional	economy	 by	 increasing	 private	 investment	 and	 large-scale	 commercial	agricultural	 investment	 (Shankland	 &	 Gonçalves	 2016:	 18).	 The	 table	 below		(Table	 1)	 contains	 the	 three	 timeline	 phases	 of	 the	 Master	 Plan	 and	 the	objectives	of	each	phase.								
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	Source:	ProSavana-PD,	Master	Plan:	Support	Agriculture	Development	Master	Plan	in	the	Nacala	
Corridor	Mozambique,	Report	No.	2,	March	2013,	p.	12.				As	 the	 table	 shows,	 the	 Master	 Plan	 is	 divided	 between	 small/medium-scale	farmers,	 farming	 organizations	 and	 agribusiness.	 As	 these	 farmers	 begin	increasing	their	agricultural	productivity	as	a	result	of	the	PI	project	(increased	research	 and	 development),	 they	 begin	 to	 become	more	 involved	with	 private	investors,	 along	 with	 the	 support	 of	 farming	 organizations	 and	 this	 leads	 to	significant	growth	in	agribusiness.	This	creates	 ‘agricultural	clusters’	across	the	19	 regions	 involved	 in	ProSAVANA.	These	are	an	 important	part	of	 the	Master	Plan	and	will	lead	to	accelerated	development	within	a	specific	area.	The	benefit	of	 creating	 these	 clusters	 is	 that	 all	 producers,	 companies	 and	 institutions	 are	involved	 within	 the	 same	 ‘central	 value	 chain’,	 which	 is	 essentially	 the	 input	suppliers,	machinery	 suppliers	 and	 specialized	 infrastructure	 suppliers.	 This	 is	combined	 with	 the	 same	 marketing	 channels,	 governmental	 institutions,	 R&D	institutions	and	training	centers.	The	impact	of	these	clusters	is	to	improve	the	development	 and	 growth	 of	 the	 agricultural	 sector,	 as	 each	 cluster	 produces	crops	 suitable	 to	 that	 particular	 region,	 thus	 productivity	 is	 more	 efficient	(ProSAVANA	PD:	Master	Plan	2013:	12-14).			
	
Table	1:	Overall	Master	Plan	
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This	Master	Plan	received	a	great	deal	of	criticism	when	it	was	leaked	in	March	2013,	 as	 it	 confirmed	 many	 peoples	 fears	 that	 ProSAVANA	 was	 laying	 the	foundations	for	an	enormous	 ‘land	grab’	by	private	 investors	within	the	Nacala	Corridor.	The	main	contention	many	had	with	this	Master	Plan	was	that	 it	was	supposed	 to	 support	 small	 farmers,	 but	 the	 plan	 was	 pushing	 farmers	 out	 of	traditional	 shifting	 cultivation	 practices	 and	 forcing	 them	 into	 intensive	cultivation	 practices	 using	 commercial	 seeds,	 chemical	 inputs	 and	 privatized	land.	It	was	also	appeared	to	force	farmers	into	contract	farming	arrangements	with	 corporate	 farms,	 which	 many	 critics	 described	 as	 a	 ‘paradise	 for	
corporations’	 (Ambiental	 et	 al.	 2013).	 This	 is	 certainly	 not	 the	 typical	 SSC	approach	to	development	assistance.			This	‘leaked	plan’	led	to	protests,	civil	society	campaigns	and	even	a	call	to	stop	the	 program	 until	 further	 consultation	 with	 small-scale	 farmers	 had	 been	established.	In	response	to	the	widespread	criticism	of	ProSAVANA	following	the	leaked	Master	Draft	in	2013,	the	Japanese	Cooperation	Agency	JICA	worked	with	Embrapa,	 ABC	 and	 the	 government	 of	 Mozambique	 to	 develop	 a	 Civil	 Society	Dialogue	 Platform	 represented	 under	 MAJOL	 (Consultoria	 &	 Servicos).	 This	would	allow	a	major	discussion	on	any	misinterpretations	or	major	concerns	of	the	 agribusiness	 model	 of	 ProSAVANA.	 A	 stakeholder	 engagement	 plan	 was	organized,	 providing	 an	 opportunity	 for	 those	 behind	 the	 project	 to	 calm	 the	storm	 and	 discuss	 the	 concerns	 of	 local	 farmers	 (MAJOL	 Stakeholder	Engagement	2016:	1).	 	The	major	 issues	that	were	addressed	were	concerns	of	mass	 land	grabbing	by	 large	 investors	and	 the	displacement	of	 small/medium-scale	 farmers.	 The	 Mozambican	 government	 reassured	 those	 opposed	 to	ProSAVANA	that	the	mission	objective	was	not	to	exploit	land	opportunities,	but	to	 benefit	 those	 small	 farmers	 through	 the	 transfer	 of	 technology,	 leading	 to	increased	 production	 and	 growth,	 which	 was	 the	 initial	 plan	 for	 the	 project.	However,	this	did	little	to	ease	concerns	and	the	project	was	temporarily	halted	while	these	issues	were	addressed.			In	April	2015,	a	revised	‘Draft	Zero’	Master	Plan	was	made	public.	This	document	was	released	in	Portuguese	only,	however	according	to	Shankland		&		Gonçalves	
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(2016:	137),	this	Master	Plan	was	very	different	from	the	2013	version	discussed	above,	 having	 undergone	 ‘many	 metamorphoses’.	 These	 changes	 involved	moving	 away	 from	 the	 heavily	 focused	 private	 investment	 in	 large-scale	agriculture	 and	 ensuring	 protection	 for	 assets	 and	 land	 rights	 of	 small-scale	farms	 in	 the	Nacala	 Corridor.	 This	was	 to	 be	 achieved	 through	maintaining	 an	open	 dialogue	 between	 investors	 and	 small-scale	 farmers	 when	 making	decisions	on	any	plans	or	contracts	(Tawa,	Anameishi	&	Noguchi	2014:	9).			Clements	(2015)	provides	a	good	comparison	between	the	2013	Master	Plan	and	the	 2015,	 Draft	 Zero	 version.	 ‘In	 an	 attempt	 to	 distance	 ProSAVANA	 from	 the	
strong	agribusiness	orientation	embodied	in	the	first	draft	of	the	Master	Plan,	Draft	
Zero	clarifies	that	ProSAVANA	is	not	specific	to	an	agribusiness	model,	but	rather	
seeks	 to	 support	 farmers	 at	 all	 scales	 of	 production-	 small,	 medium	 and	 large’	(Clements	2015:	 159).	The	 issue	of	 contention	 is	 that	 this	 vast	 territory	 of	 the	Nacala	 Corridor	 is	 not	 readily	 available	 to	 cultivation,	 as	 it	 is	 in	 fact	 used	 by	small-scale	farmers	who	do	not	want	to	be	pushed	out	of	their	land	or	have	new	practices	forced	upon	them.		
	While	 the	 2015	Master	 Plan	 acknowledges	 these	 concerns,	 it	 does	 discuss	 the	need	 to	 change	 the	 current	 farming	 practices	 used	 by	 small-scale	 farmers.	‘Producers	in	the	region	are	at	a	crucial	point	and	need	to	change	the	practice	of	
family	farming	in	order	to	survive…it	is	necessary	to	realize	that	there	will	not	be	
vast	 areas	 available	 for	 agriculture	 if	 the	 current	 predominant	 extensive	
cultivation	continues	to	be	practiced’	(Clements	2015:	160).	Essentially	the	2015	Master	 Plan	 confirms	 that	 private	 investment	 will	 be	 a	 primary	 tool	 for	increasing	 agricultural	 growth	 in	 the	 Corridor,	 but	 the	 government	 will	 take	steps	to	avoid	the	feared	‘land	grabbing’	by	enforcing	strict	Land	Law’s	between	private	 investors	 and	 communities	 and/or	 individuals.	 To	 recap,	 this	 revised	Master	Plan	has	taken	into	account	the	fears	over	large-scale	private	investment	and	 commercialization	 of	 agricultural	 production,	 yet	 reinforces	 the	 need	 to	introduce	it	in	a	controlled	and	measured	way.	This	is	vital	to	achieving	the	goals	of	ProSAVANA-PD.	Given	that	this	Draft	Zero	Master	Plan	is	still	relatively	new,	
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there	 are	 of	 course	many	who	 are	 still	 opposed	 to	 the	 project	 and	 have	 grave	concerns	over	the	impact	on	small-scale	farmers.		
	4.3	Project	for	Establishment	of	Development	Model	at	Communities	Level	with	Improvement	of	Rural	Extension	Service	(PE)		The	 final	 component	 of	 ProSAVANA	 (PE)	 has	 the	 objective	 of	 ensuring	agricultural	production	and	the	adoption	of	agricultural	development	models	in	the	target	areas.	This	began	in	May	2013	and	is	expected	to	continue	until	May	2019.	According	to	MASA	(2015)	the	PE	project	will	(ProSAVANA	PEM	2016):			
• Carry	out	agricultural	surveys	
• Define	Development	Models	to	be	implemented		
• Select	target	groups,	areas	and	partners	for	‘reference	projects’	
• Implement,	monitor	and	evaluate	those	reference	projects	
• Conduct	training	for	agricultural	producers	and	extensionists		
• Compile	 public	 policy	 recommendations	 for	 the	 improvement	 of	 the	extension	services	for	sustainable	rural	development.			The	main	agencies	 involved	 in	PE	are	 the	Mozambican	Ministry	of	Agriculture,	JICA,	Brazil’s	Association	of	Technical	Assistance	&	Rural	Extension	(ASBRAER)	and	Brazil’s	Ministry	 of	 Rural	Development	 (MDR)	 (Chichava	 	&	 	 Duran	 2016:	14).	There	is	not	a	great	deal	of	information	on	the	PE	project	at	this	stage	as	its	formulation	is	to	be	based	on	outputs	from	PI	and	PD	(Ekman		&		Macamo	2014:	9-10).			4.4	Outcome	&	Implications	of	ProSAVANA			Having	 looked	 at	 the	 aims	 and	 objectives	 of	 the	 project,	 this	 paper	 shall	 now	investigate	 the	 impact	 of	 ProSAVANA	 to	 date.	 Given	 that	 the	 major	 criticisms	regarding	 PROAGRI	were	 its	 inability	 to	 transfer	 its	 aims	 into	 tangible	 results,	has	 ProSAVANA	 achieved	 what	 it	 set	 out	 to?	 It	 is	 important	 to	 note	 that	 the	project	 is	 of	 course	 still	 in	 the	 early	 stages	 and	 the	 PD	 component	will	 not	 be	
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complete	until	2030.	This	will	limit	the	extent	to	which	one	can	comment	on	its	effectiveness,	 but	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 review	 the	 existing	 literature	 on	whether	 it	looks	likely	to	be	hailed	as	successful	as	the	Brazilian	Cerrado	transformation,	or	rather	 a	 great	 failure.	 What	 is	 most	 important	 to	 this	 thesis	 is	 whether	 this	project	 represents	 great	 progress	 for	 SSC	 and	 development	 assistance,	 or	whether	it	 is	evidence	of	a	new	form	of	exploitation	by	stronger	countries	such	as	 Japan	 and	Brazil,	 over	weaker	 countries	 like	Mozambique.	 Essentially,	 does	SSC	really	look	to	achieve	shared	goals	based	on	mutual	respect	or	is	it	simply	a	new	‘scramble	for	Africa’?			According	to	Shankland		&		Gonçalves	(2016),	the	optimism	that	was	evident	at	the	 start	 of	 the	 project	 has	 all	 but	 vanished.	 Given	 how	much	 controversy	 the	project	 has	 raised	 following	 the	 leaked	 Master	 Plan	 of	 2013,	 development	agencies	 are	 ‘wary	 of	 even	 discussing	 the	 program	 as	 the	 political	 costs	 of	
promoting	it	rises’	 (Shankland	 	&	 	Gonçalves	2016:	18).	 In	order	 to	understand	why	 ProSAVANA	 has	 not	 achieved	 the	 great	 success	 status	 intended,	 Classen	(2013)	 looks	 at	 the	 transformation	 of	 the	 Brazilian	 Cerrado,	 upon	 which	ProSavana	was	based	(PROCEDER).			Prior	 to	 cultivation,	 the	 Brazilian	 Cerrado	 was	 described	 as	 ‘barren	 and	 not	
inhabited	 land’,	 yet	 this	 simply	 wasn’t	 accurate.	 The	 project	 damaged	 large	amounts	 of	 forestlands	 and	was	 rich	 in	 diversity	 due	 to	 its	 sparse	 population	(Classen	 2013:	 27).	 The	 Brazilian	 Cerrado	 transformation	 was	 deemed	 a	 ‘big	success’	 by	 JICA	 and	many	 others	 involved	 in	 the	 project,	 yet	 there	 was	 little	consideration	 for	 environmental	 issues	 or	 the	 impact	 on	 the	 rights	 of	 the	indigenous	peoples.		Ikegami	(2015)	claims	this	same	approach	was	used	for	the	ProSAVANA	 project	 in	 Mozambique.	 The	 discourse	 surrounding	 the	transformation	 of	 the	Nacala	 Corridor	 frequently	 discusses	 the	 ‘vast	unused	or	
underused	lands’.		However,	small-scale	farmers	in	Mozambique	have	been	using	these	 lands	 for	more	 than	 just	 agricultural	 production,	 but	 as	 graveyards	 and	symbolic	 ceremonial	 sites,	 as	 places	 to	 collect	 water,	 firewood	 and	 medicine	(Ikegami	 2015:	 12).	 ProSAVANA	 largely	 ignores	 the	 views	 of	 these	 indigenous	small-scale	farmers	and	instead	serves	to	generate	large	profits	for	multinational	
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corporations.	This	is	not	in	keeping	with	the	SSC	discourse	and	its	philosophy	of	providing	sustainable,	‘needs-based’	assistance.			Another	major	criticism	of	ProSAVANA	is	the	projects	 lack	of	transparency	and	poor	communication	of	its	goals	and	more	importantly,	its	methods	of	achieving	them.	 	 As	 discussed	 above,	 ProSAVANA	 was	 based	 on	 the	 project	 in	 Brazil,	PROCEDER.	This	has	led	many	to	look	at	the	criticisms	surrounding	that	project,	particularly	 in	 regards	 to	displacement	of	 indigenous	people	and	deforestation	and	apply	those	same	concerns.	There	have	been	two	Master	Plan’s	released	for	ProSAVANA,	as	discussed	in	the	case	study,	the	2013	version	outlined	large	scale	private	 investment	 and	 focus	 on	 developing	 agribusiness	 as	 its	 methods	 for	achieving	the	project	goals.	When	this	received	widespread	criticism,	the	revised	Master	 Plan	 tried	 to	 disassociate	 itself	 with	 sweeping	 commercialization,	 but	insisted	 that	 some	 new	 commercial	 practices	 must	 be	 adopted	 in	 order	 to	achieve	success.			The	 agricultural	 NGO	 Grain	 claims	 the	 lack	 of	 transparency,	 and	 public	consultation	 on	 the	 project	 has	 naturally	 led	 to	 a	 hostile	 reception	 from	 local	farmers.	 ‘While	 agribusiness	 corporations	 have	 been	 part	 of	 government	
delegations	 to	 investigate	 business	 opportunities	 in	 the	 Nacala	 Corridor,	 the	 4	
million	farmers	living	in	the	affected	area	have	received	no	information	about	the	
intentions	shown	in	the	Master	Plan.	Three	governments	have	refused	to	make	this	
version,	or	earlier	versions	of	the	Master	Plan	available	to	the	public’	(Ambiental	2016).	The	 fact	 that	 ProSAVANA	 failed	 to	 release	 a	 clear,	 concise	Master	 Plan	outlining	the	guidelines	of	the	project,	based	on	research	and	consultation	with	current	farmers	would	help	explain	the	protests	by	civil	society	and	the	fears	of	land	grabbing	and	economic	exploitation	that	have	underlined	the	project	so	far.							
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Conclusion		Based	 on	 the	 evidence	 provided	 in	 this	 paper,	 ProSAVANA	 has	 been	 largely	ineffective	 in	 replicating	 the	 success	 of	 Brazil’s	 agricultural	 transformation	 in	Africa.	The	case	study	provided	in	this	thesis	has	shown	that	the	major	obstacles	for	ProSAVANA	have	been	resistance	 from	civil	 society	groups	 in	Mozambique,	who	see	 the	project	as	damaging	 to	 their	 future,	 rather	 than	beneficial.	This	 in	turn,	 has	 led	 to	 a	 decline	 in	 willing	 investors	 and	 decreased	 the	 projects	momentum.	 The	 case	 of	 ProSAVANA	 makes	 for	 an	 interesting	 study	 when	analysing	 SSC,	 particularly	 when	 championed	 by	 Brazil.	 In	 the	 past	 Brazil	 has	used	 its	 solidarity	with	 its	Global	 South	partners,	 as	 an	effective	 foreign	policy	tool.	It	aligns	itself	with	‘solidarity	diplomacy’	and	its	cooperation	is	presented	as	non-profit	and	unlinked	to	commercial	interests	(Nogueira	&	Ollinaho	2013:	7).	However,	 ProSAVANA’s	 predominant	 focus	 on	 private	 investment	 and	commercialisation	of	agricultural	production	would	suggest	otherwise.			Earlier	this	paper	defined	SSC	as	‘the	exchange	of	knowledge,	skills,	expertise	and	
resources	 between	 two	 or	 more	 countries	 of	 the	 Global	 South,	 aimed	 at	 their	
common	 development	 through	 concerted	 efforts’	 (UNOSSC).	 	 Based	 on	 the	outcome	 of	 the	 case	 study	 presented,	 one	 must	 ask	 to	 what	 extent	 does	ProSAVANA	 offer	 ‘common	 development’	 rather	 than	 large	 profits	 for	 private	investors,	 many	 of	 which	 are	 from	 Brazil.	 When	 analysing	 the	 ‘common	development’	 aspect	 of	 ProSAVANA,	 Wise	 (2015)	 points	 to	 the	 democratic	government	 in	place	 in	Mozambique	that	 is	 ‘rooted	in	peasant	farmers	struggles	
for	land	rights’	and	draws	a	comparison	with	the	military	dictatorship	in	Brazil	at	the	 time	 of	 the	 Brazilian	 Cerrado	 transformation	 in	 the	 1980’s.	 This	transformation	is	often	dubbed	a	‘great	success’	but	as	the	last	chapter	discussed,	many	indigenous	farmers	lost	their	land	and	it	had	quite	damaging	effects	on	the	environment.	Had	 ProSAVANA	been	 able	 to	 go	 ahead	without	 any	 protest	 and	civil	unrest,	it	may	well	have	replicated	the	land	transformation	of	the	Brazilian	Cerrado,	 but	 at	 what	 cost?	 Could	 the	 displacement	 of	 indigenous	 famers	following	the	cheap	purchase	of	land	from	private	investors	actually	be	deemed	a	‘success’?	 The	 fact	 that	 ProSAVANA	 received	 such	 criticism	 and	 has	 failed	 to	
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attract	major	 investors	 as	 a	 result	 further	 highlights	 the	 exploitative	 nature	 of	this	 project,	 rather	 than	 a	 strategy	 for	 ‘common	 development’.	 Analysis	 of	 the	discourse	surrounding	ProSAVANA	highlights	 the	Mozambican	media	approach	to	the	project	as	a	 form	of	Brazilian	 ‘neo-colonialism’	(Chichava	&	Duran	2016:	18-20)	and	a	statement	 from	the	2012	National	Peasants	Union	(UNAC)	states:	
‘ProSAVANA	is	a	result	of	top-down	policy,	which	does	not	take	into	consideration	
the	demands,	dreams	and	basic	concerns	of	peasants,	particularly	those	within	the	
Nacala	 Corridor’	 (UNAC	 ProSAVANA	 2012).	 This	 would	 further	 support	 the	argument	 that	 ProSAVANA	 as	 a	 project	 does	 not	 appear	 to	 be	 in	 line	with	 the	principles	 of	 SSC,	 particularly	 that	 of	 achieving	 ‘common	development’.	 This	 is	largely	 due	 to	 a	 large	 role	 of	 private	 investors	 combined	 with	 a	 lack	 of	transparency,	 leaving	 Mozambican	 farmers	 anxious	 as	 to	 how	 this	 will	 affect	them	in	the	future.			Finally,	with	academics	 such	as	Carmody	 (2013)	discussing	 the	 ‘New	Scramble	for	Africa’	that	is	taking	pace	among	emerging	donors,	 it	 is	vital	SSC	projects	in	the	future	avoid	making	the	same	mistakes	as	ProSAVANA.	Brazil	has	chosen	to	portray	 itself	 as	 a	 leader	 of	 SSC	 and	 development	 assistance	 based	 on	mutual	respect	and	shared	goals,	yet	ProSAVANA	does	not	appear	to	reflect	that,	despite	good	intentions.	There	is	already	growing	academic	debate	surrounding	China’s	role	in	Africa,	with	many	discussing	whether	it	really	is	a	key	promoter	of	SSC	or	simply	 exploiting	 its	 natural	 resources	 (Ayodele	 &	 Sotola	 2014:	 Dollar	 et	 al.	2015:	Pigato	2015).			In	order	for	SSC	to	continue	to	be	effective,	there	must	be	greater	transparency	in	 projects,	 especially	 when	 dealing	 with	 such	 sensitive	 issues,	 such	 as	 land	reforms	 in	 countries	 like	Mozambique.	 There	 have	 been	 calls	 for	 the	 Brazilian	government	to	accept	greater	responsibility	 in	ensuring	SSC	projects	are	based	on	 shared	 goals	 of	 development	 and	 mutual	 respect	 of	 fellow	 developing	countries.	Projects	 like	ProSAVANA	that	have	attracted	a	great	deal	of	negative	attention	draw	speculation	to	the	rising	power	status	of	Brazil	and	suggest	Brazil	is	using	SSC	as	a	foreign	policy	tool	at	the	expense	of	African	nations,	rather	than	as	 a	partner	of	African	nations	 (Mbaye	2011:	Esposito	&	Tse	2015).	This	 issue	
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must	 be	 addressed	 immediately	 and	 greater	 efforts	 must	 be	 taken	 to	 prevent	similar	 claims	 in	 future	 SSC	 projects.	 As	 discussed	 earlier	 in	 this	 paper,	previously	successful	projects	between	Brazil	and	African	nations	in	areas	such	as	 health	 and	 education	 have	 seen	 Brazil	 transfer	 its	 technical	 expertise	effectively	 and	 help	 African	 nations	 tackle	 major	 health	 issues	 while	strengthening	 their	 institutional	 capabilities	 to	 enable	 these	 developing	countries	to	be	less	dependent	on	foreign	assistance.	This	paper	does	recognise	the	 benefits	 of	 SSC	 and	 the	 success	 it	 has	 achieved.	 However,	 taking	 World	Systems	 Theory	 into	 account,	 it	 is	 vital	 Brazil	 and	 other	 ‘semi-periphery’	countries	that	promote	SSC,	are	not	seen	to	be	extracting	wealth	and	resources	from	developing	 countries	 such	 as	 African	 nations	 and	 damaging	 the	 image	 of	SSC	 in	 the	 long-term.	 	 ProSAVANA	has	been	 largely	unsuccessful	 in	 replicating	the	success	achieved	in	Brazil	and	has	attracted	considerable	criticism	due	to	its	lack	of	transparency	combined	with	its	focus	on	private	sector	investment.	Brazil	must	 learn	 from	 this	 and	 ensure	 future	 SSC	projects	 are	 transparent,	 open	 for	discussion	and	clearly	promote	 the	principles	of	mutual	 respect	of	 sovereignty	and	shared	development	goals	between	all	nations	involved.					 													
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